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Executive Summary
African least-developed countries [ALDCs] have 
enjoyed preferential treatment in exporting their 
agricultural products to developed countries. 
Reductions of agricultural trade barriers on a most- 
favored nation [MFN] basis by preference-granting 
developed countries may erode the benefits of 
these preferences. In particular, MFN tariff reduc­
tions coordinated through a World Trade Organi­
zation [WTO] agreement could cause serious pref­
erence erosions, and the current Doha Round of 
trade negotiations, aimed at ambitiously reducing 
agricultural trade barriers, may conclude with such 
an agreement.
The Doha Round has also declared a "development 
agenda," which emphasizes the interests of devel­
oping countries, including the LDCs. The so-called 
special and differential treatment of developing 
countries—of which trade preferences make up an 
important instrument—is designed to help realize 
the development agenda and counter any unwanted 
consequences from multilateral liberalization. Some 
WTO members have discussed extending trade 
preferences as a way to safeguard the interests of 
the LDCs, but the desirability and feasibility of this 
proposal have been debated with diverging views.
This case discusses a range of policy issues relating 
to preference erosion and WTO multilateral trade 
liberalization, including the role of preferences in 
promoting exports from the ALDCs, the extent 
and scope of likely preference erosion, and the 
possibility of extending preferences. It analyzes the 
positions and interests of several key stakeholders, 
especially the ALDCs, and presents policy options 
for tackling these issues. Specifically, the so-called 
July Package proposal for extending preferences has 
been interpreted as "deepening, widening, 
broadening, and strengthening" preferential treat­
ment for ALDCs. An analysis of the quantitative 
estimates of the impact of these actions shows that 
preference erosion is indeed a concern for the 
ALDCs and that adopting the July Package will help 
the ALDCs cope with the erosion. Furthermore, 
costs to the preference-granting countries of 
adopting these measures are estimated to be 
modest, and trade diversion does not appear to be 
a serious concern for third countries.
Responding to concerns about preference erosion, 
a number of authors argue that enhancing pref­
erences is not the right answer to the problem. 
They insist that the multilateralism championed by 
the WTO will eventually help the poorest countries 
and that transitory issues such as preference ero­
sion can be handled by complementary nontrade 
policy measures, including effective development 
aid and investment in domestic infrastructure.
Your assignment is to propose a policy package 
that would tackle the preference erosion problem 
facing ALDCs, for discussion by the WTO. The 
package may include policies to strengthen 
preferences and/or complementary measures.
Background
African least-developed countries have enjoyed 
preferential treatment in exporting their agricul­
tural products to developed countries. These pref­
erences are attractive to the ALDCs because of the 
low trade barriers compared with those facing non­
beneficiary countries. In many cases, the high MFN 
trade barriers established by developed countries 
support artificially high prices in their domestic 
markets. Tariff preferences make it possible for the 
beneficiary countries to enjoy these artificially high 
prices.1 For instance, two systems of nonreciprocal 
trade preferences specifically concern the LDCs' 
exports to the EU—the African, Caribbean, Pacific 
countries [ACP] preferences and the Generalized 
System of Preferences [GSP] scheme, with the latter 
recently replaced by the Everything but Arms 
[EBA] initiative [European Community 2001a], The 
EBA covers all the LDC countries designated by the 
United Nations and removes all restrictions, 
including tariffs and tariff rate quotas, on virtually 
all exports from the LDCs to the European Union,
1 Whether the difference between the high domestic price 
in a preference-granting country and the corresponding 
world market price is collected by the preference-receiv­
ing country is an empirical question. It is possible that 
this wedge is either partially or fully captured by the 
preference-granting country, in the discussion here, it is 
assumed that beneficiary countries receive at least part of 
the wedge.
without reciprocal action by the LDCs [see Yu and 
Jensen 2005 for an introduction to the EBA].
Other developed countries also offer preferences 
to the ALDCs, either through their own GSP 
schemes or through specially designed preference 
schemes. For example, the ALDCs receive pref­
erences from the United States through the GSP 
program for the LDCs, whose terms are typically 
more favorable [duty-free access for covered 
exports] than those for non-LDC countries. Many 
ALDCs have also become eligible for the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA]. Like the 
United States, Japan grants preferences to the LDCs 
through its own GSP program. Unlike the U.S. GSP 
program, however, the Japanese GSP program does 
not grant duty-free access for the covered 
products, and average tariff rates for covered 
products are only slightly lower than the average 
preferential rates for non-LDC GSP countries. In 
general, judging from their product coverage and 
the depth of the margins of the preferences, the 
preference schemes of non-EU developed countries 
are not as favorable as the EBA.
Reducing agricultural trade barriers on an MFN 
basis, however, may erode the benefits of these 
preferences to the preference-receiving countries. 
On the one hand, MFN trade reforms—unilateral 
or multilateral—lower market access barriers and 
other protection measures for exports from the 
LDCs' competitors, thereby reducing the advan­
tages of the preference-receiving countries over 
their competitors. On the other hand, the disman­
tling of trade barriers by the preference-granting 
countries may lead to lowered domestic market 
prices in these countries, thereby hurting high-cost, 
preference-receiving exporters. In addition, MFN 
trade reforms by large trading countries generally 
push up world market prices, thereby hurting net 
food-importing countries, including many of the 
ALDCs. When MFN tariff cuts are coordinated at 
the multilateral level—which has often happened 
following the conclusion of a GATT/ WTO trade 
negotiation round—the effect on preference 
erosion can be serious.
One of the aims of the current Doha Round of 
WTO negotiations is to tackle the unfinished busi­
ness from the Uruguay Round by ambitiously 
reducing agricultural trade barriers. A t the same 
time the Doha Round has a "development agenda," 
which emphasizes the interests of developing
countries, including least-developed countries. The 
so-called special and differential treatment of devel­
oping countries—of which trade preferences make 
up an important instrument—is designed to realize 
the development agenda and to counter any 
unwanted consequences of the multilateral liberali­
zation process. Among the many proposals sug­
gested during the lengthy negotiation process, 
extending trade preferences has been included as a 
way to safeguard the interests of the LDCs. For 
instance, in the so-called July Package of the WTO 
agricultural trade negotiations [WTO 2004, A-7], 
it is stipulated that "developed Members, and 
developing country Members in a position to do 
so, should provide duty-free and quota-free market 
access for products originating from least-devel­
oped countries." This proposal reflects the position 
of the ALDCs: they ask for further preferential 
treatment from developed and advanced developing 
countries and exemptions from reforming their 
own policies.
Debates on the desirability and feasibility of adopt­
ing this proposal are ongoing. Some worry about 
the inability of preferences to promote agricultural 
exports and economic development in the LDCs 
and doubt the value of preferences as an effective 
measure of special and differential treatment. In 
support of this argument, adherents often cite the 
poor export performance of the LDCs. These 
worries are compounded by the fear that the 
preferential approach may slow down the multi­
lateral liberalization process and compromise or 
delay potential gains from a freer multilateral 
trading system. Others point out that developing 
countries in general could gain more from market 
access reforms based on the MFN approach and 
that the erosion of preferences [due to MFN 
liberalization] does not appear to be a big issue if 
substantial MFN reforms are conducted multi- 
Iaterally. Still others argue that the LDCs do not 
necessarily gain from multilateral trade reforms, 
that the existing preferences are vital to their inter­
ests, and that any enhancement of such preferences 
would help mitigate any adverse effects from 
multilateral reforms. Lastly, many have noticed that 
various conditions, clauses, and rules attached to 
existing preference programs may have hindered 
recipient countries from taking full advantage of 
these programs and therefore preferences should 
not be held responsible for the poor export 
performance of the LDCs. Instead of giving up on 
preferences altogether, some argue that efforts
should be made to improve the rules associated 
with the preference programs to make them more 
effective.
Taking the July Package as the departure point, this 
case discusses a range of policy issues relating to 
preference erosion and WTO multilateral trade 
liberalizations. It analyzes the positions and attitudes 
of several key stakeholders and presents policy 
options for tackling the policy issues.
Policy Issues
Several policy issues are relevant to this analysis of 
the desirability of enhancing trade preferences. The 
first issue concerns the role of trade preferences in 
promoting exports and growth in the LDCs and 
whether or not they have actually been utilized. 
Next is the issue of whether preference erosion is 
serious enough to warrant talks about enhancing 
these preferences. The third issue is whether there 
is the needed “policy space" to implement the 
proposal. Lastly, some quantitative estimates on the 
costs and benefits of implementing the proposal are
offered.
The Role of Preferences in Promoting 
Exports and Growth
Existing preference programs were often estab­
lished for the purpose of promoting exports from 
the recipient countries. By stimulating exports from 
these countries, these preferences, it was hoped, 
would lead to economic growth there. Naturally, 
the debate on preferences not only concerns the 
associated short-term commercial value, but also 
the long-run implications for export-led economic 
growth. Moreover, as this favorable treatment is 
not meant to be constant and permanent—the 
reference MFN trade barriers in agriculture were 
reduced following the Uruguay Round and are 
expected to fall further as an outcome of the Doha 
Round—the wisdom of lobbying for this intrin­
sically temporary favor has also been questioned.
Judging from the poor export and general 
economic performance of the LDCs—whose export 
shares in total world trade have actually declined— 
it seems that preferences have not realized their 
declared purposes. It would be difficult to pin the 
causes of the poor performance solely on trade 
preferences, however, and to simply declare the
demise of such programs. Any empirical analysis 
would have to establish a counterfactual scenario in 
which these economies had faced the MFN trade 
barriers and then compare this hypothetical 
scenario with reality.
Instead of debating the general role of preferences, 
a more tangible issue is the actual utilization of 
agricultural trade preferences by the recipient 
countries, which reveals the perceived value of 
preferences to the recipient countries. A few recent 
papers explore this issue by painstakingly collecting 
detailed trade data at tariff line levels and identify­
ing whether exports under a specific tariff line in a 
certain market actually applied the available pref­
erential tariffs. For instance, Inama [2004] observed 
underutilization of several trade preference 
programs [covering both agricultural and non- 
agricultural products] by the so-called QUAD 
countries [Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United 
States], The study argues that the value and effec­
tiveness of the preferences available to LDCs' 
exports are discounted by the observed low utiliza­
tion rates—a finding that is probably caused by the 
study's failure to take into consideration the fact 
that exports from beneficiary countries may be 
eligible for multiple preference programs offered 
by the same preference-granting country [that is, 
multiple eligibility]. Unlike the Inama study, a 2004 
study from the Organization for Economic Coop­
eration and Development [OECD] focuses exclu­
sively on the utilization of agricultural preferences 
granted by the EU and the United States. By 
observing multiple eligibility, the study finds that 
preference utilization rates are actually quite high 
for both the EU and the U.S. preference programs. 
For the EU programs, the overall utilization rate 
exceeded 89 percent in 2002, and half of the eligi­
ble imports that did not use preferences entered 
the EU mostly through duty-free quotas and tariff 
suspensions. For the U.S. programs, the utilization 
rate was 88 percent in 2002. Some of the eligible 
exports entered the U.S. market under MFN rates 
owing to rules of origin and compliance costs, 
whereas other eligible exports opted for the low 
available MFN rates.
To summarize, when the multiple eligibility phe­
nomenon is accounted for, it appears that agricul­
tural trade preferences have indeed been used, 
implying that developing countries derive com­
mercial value from these programs. The main 
problem associated with these programs is the
observed low export volumes, which are probably 
partially related to the limited product coverage of 
existing preference programs.2 Improving trade 
preferences by enlarging product coverage of such 
programs and by asking more countries to grant 
such preferences could expand exports from the 
recipient countries.
Preference Erosion and Multilateral 
Liberalization
In addition to the apparent usefulness of pref­
erences to the recipient countries, the case for 
their enhancement can be further illustrated by 
analyzing the issue of preference erosion in the 
presence of multilateral liberalization.
Is preference erosion a legitimate concern? How 
large would the negative effect associated with 
preference erosion be? Several recent studies have 
discussed the impact of multilateral liberalization or 
unilateral MFN liberalization by individual 
preference-granting countries on preference­
receiving countries. Wainio and Gibson [2004] 
point out that the exact impact of MFN tariff cuts 
by the United States on countries receiving its 
nonreciprocal preference programs depends on the 
scope of the preferential treatment granted, the 
size of preference margins, and the depth of the 
MFN tariff cuts. They show that overall the benefi­
ciary countries of the U.S. preference programs 
would gain from MFN tariff liberalization. For 
countries highly dependent on preferences, how­
ever, the negative effects of preference erosion 
outweigh the positive effects of MFN tariff liberali­
zation. A slightly later study by Wainio and 
Gehlhar [2004] provides a detailed description of 
U.S. nonreciprocal preference programs, covering 
eligible products and countries, margins of the 
preferences (compared with the MFN rates], 
products excluded from the preferences and the 
applicable MFN rates, and the export patterns of 
the beneficiary countries in the U.S. market. Based
2 This is especially the case for those excluded products that the LDCs have the potential to export and that face high tariffs. For instance, agricultural products excluded from the U.S. preference programs generally have higher tariffs than those products included in the programs. It should be noted, however, that in some instances, even given the enhanced preferential treatment, the LDCs may still not be able to realize their potential, owing to poor infrastructure, high domestic transaction costs, and inadequate investment.
on this detailed data analysis, the study examines 
whether beneficiaries of U.S. nonreciprocal trade 
preference programs gain more from cutting MFN 
rates on products excluded from these programs 
or lose more from the erosion of the preferences 
that they do enjoy. They conclude that developing 
countries as a whole would gain market shares in 
the U.S. market from substantial MFN tariff liber­
alization and that it is counterproductive for these 
countries as a group to oppose MFN liberalization. 
In drawing this conclusion, they emphasize the 
potential gains from liberalizing those products that 
are not included in the preference programs. Their 
results also show, however, that there would be 
only minor export expansions in the U.S. market 
for the LDCs (Wainio and Gehlhar 2004, Tables 7— 
9], and their share in total U.S. imports would drop 
after MFN reforms, confirming the likely vulnera­
ble position of the LDCs in the upcoming multi­
lateral trade liberalization.
Unlike the U.S. preferences, which have incomplete 
coverage for agriculture and food products, the EU 
preferences granted to the LDCs provide broader 
product coverage and have recently been enhanced 
with the adoption of the EBA initiative. Not sur­
prisingly, the amount of agricultural exports and 
the range of products exported from the ALDCs 
to the EU far exceed those to the United States. 
Yu and Jensen (2005] assess the impact of the EBA 
initiative on the ALDCs and show that further 
multilateral trade liberalization may erode the EBA 
preferences. Because the EBA extends product 
coverage only slightly beyond that of previous 
preference programs, the welfare impacts of the 
EBA on the ALDCs are shown to be small. More­
over, these small gains are likely to disappear if the 
EU adopts MFN trade policy reforms, with the 
result that the ALDCs would actually be worse off. 
Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liber­
alization scenario reinforces the finding that the 
LDCs may well lose owing to preference erosion 
and higher world market prices for their imports. 
These results are echoed in Bureau et al. (2004], 
They find that the implementation of the 
"Harbinson proposal" would lead to a slight welfare 
gain (0.3 percent] for the poorest countries. The 
gain is not evenly distributed, however—Sub- 
Saharan African countries as a whole would 
experience a slight loss (0.1 percent] owing to 
preference erosion and higher costs for imported 
food.
Because of the differences in the EU and U.S. 
preference programs and the narrower focus on 
the ALDCs by the Yu and Jensen study, the above 
cited studies reach different policy implications. 
Whereas the Wainio and Gehlhar study finds that 
MFN reforms would lead to more gains in the U.S. 
market for developing countries as a whole and 
that multilateral liberalization is generally a better 
option for developing countries, the Yu and Jensen 
study concludes that the ALDCs may well lose 
from this process. It appears from the results of 
Wainio and Gehlhar, however, that the LDCs' share 
in the U.S. import market would decline following 
the MFN reform, a point that is consistent with Yu 
and Jensen. The Wainio and Gibson study provides 
indirect support to this point as well by concluding 
that countries highly dependent on trade 
preferences may lose from preference erosion. 
Therefore, there seems to be some agreement 
about the LDCs' vulnerability in coping with MFN 
market access reforms by preference-granting 
countries.
Stakeholders
So far, the analysis has focused on the African 
LDCs, the obvious stakeholders who are in danger 
of suffering from preference erosions. They are not 
the only stakeholders in this discussion, however, 
as preference-granting developed countries, devel­
oping countries not covered in nonreciprocal 
preference programs, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATTJ/WTO are all 
concerned and involved.
Preference-Granting Developed Countries
The interests of the preference-granting developed 
countries are multidimensional, ranging from main­
taining tariff revenues, supporting domestic 
production, and balancing the interests of other 
trading partners to avoiding compromising their 
positions in the multilateral negotiations. In addi­
tion, geopolitics and non-economic strategic inter­
ests may also influence the actions of these 
countries. Here, the discussion is limited to these 
countries' economic concerns.
First and most obviously, further reducing 
preferential trade barriers will lead to reduced tariff 
revenues for the preference-granting countries, 
provided that the goods under the preference
programs are currently imported, with bigger 
losses associated with larger current preferential 
imports. Second, depending on the size of the 
current preferential imports and the cuts to 
current preferential trade barriers, domestic 
producers in the preference-granting countries may 
be hurt by a surge in expanded preferential 
imports. This disguised “cost" can be desirable for 
consumers, however, if the increased imports help 
to bring down artificially high domestic prices. 
Third, in the case of a preference-granting country 
also providing less favorable preferences to non- 
LDC developing countries, reducing preferential 
trade barriers to the LDCs will "erode" the pref­
erence enjoyed by these other countries. This 
erosion can become a concern for the preference­
granting countries if they want to keep those 
preferences attractive to the non-LDC developing 
countries. For instance, the transitory measure 
adopted in the EBA regarding sugar exports from 
the LDCs may be more a response to the demands 
from non-LDC ACP countries than to those from 
domestic producers in the EU. Lastly but perhaps 
most important, a developed country's attitude 
toward preferences is an integrated component of 
its overall negotiation position in the WTO multi­
lateral talks. Therefore, whether or not a country is 
willing to enhance its nonreciprocal preferences will 
depend on how that country evaluates the influence 
of the change on its overall negotiation objectives 
and strategies in the multilateral talks.
Developing Countries Not Covered in 
Nonreciprocal Preference Programs
For developing countries that are not covered in 
any preference program, there are two questions: 
Does enhancing preferences for the LDCs divert 
trade away from these countries? And can the loss 
due to diverted trade be made up through MFN 
cuts by the preference-granting countries? Answers 
to these questions depend on the composition and 
pattern of exports of these countries vis-a-vis those 
of the LDCs. If a developing country is competing 
directly with LDCs in the same export market, then 
further reducing preferential tariffs for the LDCs 
may divert trade away from that country. MFN 
tariff cuts by the same developed country may, 
however, make up for the diverted trade flow.
WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The delays [and the recent suspension] in the 
current WTO agricultural trade negotiations 
demonstrate the difficulties of reaching an agree­
ment when negotiating parties have varying inter­
ests in a host of negotiation areas. A member's 
ability to influence the negotiation agenda in the 
presence of diverging views and interests is decided 
largely by its power and negotiation capacities. 
Traditionally, large rich countries and blocs of rich 
countries have had the power and negotiation 
capacities to influence the agenda of past trade 
talks. In the Doha Round, large developing coun­
tries have started to form alliances [such as the 
Group of 20, or G-20] for the purpose of putting 
their interests on the negotiation table. The LDCs, 
however, have remained more or less on the fringe 
of these talks because of their lack of negotiation 
capacities and skills. It is thus no surprise that the 
issue of preference erosion has not been taken 
more seriously by the major players in the negotia­
tions [of course, the nonreciprocal nature of pref­
erences also makes it difficult for the LDCs to 
engage in give-and-take bargaining]. But by not 
taking the issue of preference erosion seriously, the 
Doha Round runs the risk of further alienating the 
poorest members of the WTO, who are supposed 
to benefit from the round's development agenda.
Policy Options for Improving ALDCs' 
Market Access
The evidence suggests that agricultural trade pref­
erences have been widely used and that preference 
erosion is a legitimate concern from the perspective 
of the ALDCs (if not for developing countries as a 
whole]. The next logical question is how the 
preferential treatment—as part of the special and 
differential treatment stipulated in the Doha devel­
opment agenda’—can be improved. There are both 
trade-related and non-trade-related policy options. 
Here, the discussion is limited to how LDCs' market 
access can be improved through enhanced 
preferences.
Deepening, Widening, Broadening, and 
Strengthening Agricultural Trade 
Preferences
The July Package text entails a full set of trade 
policy options to tackle the preference-erosion
issue. First, developed countries can "deepen" their 
preference programs by granting the ALDCs duty- 
and quota-free market access to all agricultural 
products covered in existing programs. Second, 
developed countries can "widen" the coverage of 
their preference programs by extending duty- and 
quota-free access to those agricultural products 
that have not been covered in existing programs. 
These two types of actions essentially imply EBA- 
style preference programs by all developed coun­
tries to the ALDCs. Third, preferential market 
access for ALDC exports can be "broadened" to 
include advanced developing countries in the group 
of preference-granting countries. Lastly, preference­
granting countries can "strengthen" existing 
preference programs and new preference initiatives 
by making them permanent and unconditional. One 
possibility is to develop a set of WTO rules that 
would be applied to all preferential programs 
targeting the LDCs. The new rules should include 
simpler rules of origin and minimum administrative 
costs for exporters. They should not contain any 
eligibility conditions [beyond requiring recipients to 
be LDCs] that would exclude certain LDCs from the 
program or safeguard clauses that may discourage 
recipient countries from investing and from gaining 
substantial market shares.
Next, is there scope for implementing such a 
proposal, given the current state of existing 
preference programs? The answer here is an 
emphatic yes. Broadening preferences by including 
advanced developing countries is possible, as these 
countries generally have not yet provided the LDCs 
with extensive and substantial trade preferences. 
Strengthening existing trade preferences is not only 
needed, but also feasible because there are many 
problems associated with individual programs that 
limit their effectiveness in promoting exports from 
the recipient countries. The possibility of deepening 
and widening preferences granted by developed 
countries, however, deserves some elaboration.
Existing Preference Programs and the Scope 
for Implementing the Proposed Policy 
Measures
In the case of the EU, there seems to be limited 
room for improving its preference programs 
because of the recently adopted EBA initiative. 
Upon fully implementing the EBA (including phas­
ing out the transitory measures for sugar, bananas, 
and rice], the EU will be in a good position to
argue for EBA-style preferences from all developed 
countries and advanced developing countries.
The cases of Japan and the United States are quite 
different from that of the EU. There, deepening 
and widening preferences for the ALDCs will 
require meaningful actions. The United States will 
need to expand existing programs to cover 
currently excluded products. The Japanese 
programs will need to both expand product cover­
age and deepen the preference margins for covered 
products.
The United States grants preferences to the ALDCs 
through the GSP program for the LDCs, which is 
typically more favorable [duty-free access to 
covered exports] than that for the non-LDC coun­
tries. Many ALDCs have also become eligible for 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
[AGOA]. Data from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission [USITC]3 show that out of about 1,800 
U.S. tariff lines, about 400 MFN tariff lines are 
duty free. Among the remaining tariff lines, about 
1,100 lines are duty free for the LDCs through the 
U.S. preference programs. These preferences, how­
ever, lower the simple average tariffs faced by the 
LDCs only marginally [from the overall simple aver­
age of 9.7 percent to the simple average of 5.6 
percent for the GSP-LDC countries]. This is because 
the dutiable tariff lines not covered in the 
preference programs generally have higher tariffs 
than those lines covered in the preference 
programs. Therefore, there is scope for extending 
those preferences to the dutiable lines that are not 
covered in the current U.S. preference programs.
Like the United States, Japan grants preferences to 
the LDCs through the GSP program.4 Before 2003, 
this program granted preferences to about 300 
tariff lines [out of about 2,000 lines] for the LDCs, 
reducing the average duty for the LDCs from 15.6 
percent to 14.2 percent. For those lines not covered 
by the GSP, there are about 400 duty-free lines 
and more than 1,300 dutiable lines. Those 
uncovered dutiable lines generally have higher tariff 
rates. Unlike the U.S. GSP program, the Japanese
3 These are drawn from the summary compiled by 
Brenton and Ikezuki [2004] and Wainio and Gehlhar 
[2004],
4 Numbers in this paragraph are calculated from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD] TRAINS database and are drawn from 
Brenton and Ikezuki [2004],
GSP programs did not grant duty-free access for 
the covered products, and the average tariff rate 
for covered products was 9.8 percent for the LDCs, 
only slightly lower than the average preferential 
rate for non-LDC GSP countries. Since 2003 Japan 
has expanded GSP product coverage for the LDCs 
by adding about 200 products, or about 10 
percent of total tariff lines. So it seems that Japan 
would have to make extensive concessions to the 
LDCs in order for them to enjoy universal duty- 
and quota-free access to its market.
In addition, there is ample room for strengthening 
these preferences. A long list of difficulties asso­
ciated with applying the existing preferences can be 
compiled, ranging from eligibility rules, product 
coverage, and rules of origin to certainty of com­
mitments and the number of schemes. In practice, 
some of these conditions and clauses play similar 
roles as nontariff barriers in limiting export expan­
sion from the beneficiary countries.
Take, for example, the recent EBA initiative. The 
EBA largely retains the safeguard measures speci­
fied in the GSP of the EU, with some amendments. 
Most notable among the amendments is the addi­
tion of the situation of "massive imports into the 
EU market" as a trigger for withdrawing the pref­
erences. With regard to three sensitive products 
[sugar, bananas, and rice], the EU is allowed to sus­
pend preferences entirely if imports cause serious 
disruptions to the EU's mechanisms for regulating 
these products.5 In addition, the rules of origin 
specified in the GSP also apply to the EBA initia­
tive. Likewise, the U.S. and Japan GSP programs 
contain various preconditions and clauses. 
According to USITC data [http ://w w w .usitc.gov], 
the preferences offered through the AGOA are 
meant for all 48 Sub-Saharan African countries, but 
until recently only 37 countries from this region 
had gained eligibility. Likewise, only 41 LDCs are 
deemed eligible for its GSP-LDC preferences. The 
Japanese GSP program also contains safeguard 
clauses and a graduation clause to exclude one 
country's exports from the program when they
5 Serious disruptions refer to, among other things, 
reduction in the market shares of European producers, 
reduction in their production, increases in their stocks, 
closure of their production capacity, bankruptcies, low 
profitability, low rate of capacity utilization, reduced 
employment, increased imports, and lowered prices 
[European Community 2001a, b].
reach a certain market share and a certain minimum 
value.
These measures and preconditions are clearly 
detrimental to creating a stable trading environ­
ment for the ALDCs, and they may discourage 
producers in the ALDCs from committing needed 
investments to reduce their high production costs. 
Panagariya [2002] argues that it is precisely these 
measures that have rendered preferences ineffec­
tive. Strengthening the legal status of the 
preferences by making them universal, permanent, 
and binding through WTO rules could well boost 
their performance.
Estimated Impacts of Implementing the 
Proposed Policy Measures on the 
Stakeholders
This section presents hypothetical scenarios of 
deepening, widening, and broadening agricultural 
trade preferences for the ALDCs, calculated using a 
quantitative simulation framework. Because of the 
multiregional and multisectoral nature of the issues 
to be analyzed, such scenarios are simulated within 
a global computable general equilibrium model 
named GTAP [Hertel 1997, Chapter 2], The GTAP 
model is accompanied by a global data set com­
monly known as the GTAP database [Dimaranan 
and McDougall 2002], The main components of 
the database are detailed input-output tables for all 
the regions and countries included in the data set; 
consistent bilateral trade flows among all the 
regions and countries; a protection data set that 
covers ad valorem tariff equivalents, export subsi­
dies, and domestic support measures; and macro- 
economic aggregates. Together, these components 
give a snapshot of the world economy at the base 
year of the database, and all the usual equilibrium 
conditions are satisfied in the database.
The latest version of the database, version 6, 
contains data for 86 regions and 57 commodities 
for the year 2001, including a fairly detailed break­
down of agricultural and food products. This study 
applies an aggregated version of this most recent 
GTAP database, with 21 aggregated regions and 24 
aggregated products. The six individual African 
LDCs [Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia] are included in the aggregated 
database as one group [with the short name of 
SSA-1], whereas other African LDCs are largely 
included in the aggregated Rest of Sub-Sahara
African [SSA-2] region.6 Among the non-LDC 
regions are influential agricultural trading countries 
and regions such as Argentina, Australia and New 
Zealand, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU-25, India, 
Japan, and the United States. Agriculture and food 
products in the original GTAP database are incor­
porated in the aggregated version as separated 
items, including paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains, 
fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, plant fibers, other 
crops, other animal products, bovine meats, other 
meats, vegetable oil, dairy, processed rice, sugar, 
other processed food products, and beverages and 
tobacco. In addition to these, nonagricultural 
products are aggregated as natural resources, tex­
tiles and clothing, manufacturing, and services.
Scenarios of Implementation of the Policy 
Measures
The deepening, widening, and broadening scenarios 
can be formulated as the reduction or removal of 
relevant tariffs facing exporters from the ALDCs. In 
this study, the GTAP version 6 database is viewed 
as the initial equilibrium point of the world econ­
omy. After the shocks pertaining to the policy 
scenarios are applied to the model, new equilibria 
are computed and updated data sets corresponding 
to and describing the new equilibria are generated. 
The differences between the original data set [the 
base case] and the updated data sets are then sum­
marized and viewed as the effects attributable to 
the policy changes.
Three hypothetical scenarios are considered. 
Scenario 1 is a multilateral market access liberaliza­
tion scenario in which all the non-LDC regions 
contained in the aggregated data set are assumed to 
halve their MFN tariff rates for ail agricultural and
6 The aggregated SSA-2 region contains 43 individual 
countries, of which 33 are LDCs and the rest are non- 
LDCs. Because the GTAP version 6 database does not 
provide a further breakdown of this region, we are 
forced to treat this as an aggregated LDC region. Any 
preference granted by developed and advanced develop­
ing countries in practice and in the hypothetical scenarios 
of the study is assumed to be available to the non-LDC 
countries in SSA-2 region as well. Consequently, numeri­
cal results obtained for this aggregated region are for 
both the LDC members and non-LDC members of this 
group. Nevertheless, because the majority of countries in 
this group are LDCs and most of the non-LDC members 
also receive preferences, it is expected that this is a 
meaningful grouping.
food products. To be consistent with the July Pack­
age proposal, the ALDCs are not assumed to 
reduce their own market access barriers. Such a 
scenario sets a benchmark against which the subse­
quent broadening and deepening scenarios can be 
compared.
Scenario 2 is the deepening and widening scenario. 
In addition to the MFN market access reforms as 
simulated in scenario 1, advanced economies 
[Australia and New Zealand, Canada, the EU-25, 
Japan, the Rest of East Asia [mainly South Korea 
and Taiwan], and the United States] are assumed to 
deepen and widen their preferential treatment for 
the ALDCs to the extent that all tariffs imposed on 
exports from the ALDCs are eliminated. This sce­
nario essentially assumes an EBA offer from all 
advanced countries. The initiator of the EBA [the 
EU-25] is assumed to implement the EBA in its 
entirety, implying that the transitory measures on 
sugar, rice, and bananas are removed immediately. 
For other advanced countries, this scenario implies 
widening product coverage of their respective 
preference programs and deepening preference 
margins for covered products. Because the shocks 
contained in scenario 1 are also included in scenario 
2, the differences between results obtained from 
scenarios 1 and 2 can then be attributed to the 
deepening of trade preferences.
Scenario 3 is the broadening scenario. The design 
of this scenario again allows for comparison with 
the previous scenarios. Here, both the multilateral 
market access reform shocks and the deepening 
shocks are included, in addition to the new shocks 
involving the extension of EBA-style preferences to 
the ALDCs by several large developing economies, 
including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
[ASEAN],
Results
Simulation results from the three policy scenarios 
are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Here the focus is 
on the changes in total exports from the two 
ALDC regions and the resulting changes in 
economic welfare measured in equivalent variations. 
To facilitate discussing the individual effects of 
multilateral market access reforms, the deepening 
and widening of preferences, and the broadening of 
preferences, results for scenario 1 are calculated as 
changes/percentage changes from base case data,
whereas results for scenario 2 [scenario 3] are com­
puted as changes/percentage changes from the 
updated dataset obtained from scenario 1 [scenario 
2], In other words, the results reported for 
scenario 2 are due to the deepening and widening 
of preferences only, whereas the results reported 
for scenario 3 are due to the broadening of 
preferences only.7
Scenario l  As Table 1 shows, total agricultural and 
food exports from both SSA-1 and SSA-2 would 
drop by more than 6 percent under scenario 1. 
Underlying this aggregate change are near-universal 
declines in exports of all agricultural and food 
products. The largest percentage changes are in 
fruits and vegetables, bovine meats, other meats, 
and sugar. The most significant changes in terms of 
trade volumes, however, are in other crops, other 
food, and fruits and vegetables, because these are 
the products in which the two ALDCs have sub­
stantial base case exports. For instance, the 
decreases in exports of other crops of 5.9 percent 
for SSA-1 and 4.4 percent for SSA-2 are equivalent 
to losses in export volumes of around US$60 
million for the former and US$150 million for the 
latter. Among the few exceptions to this declining 
pattern are the slight increases in exports of rice 
and plant fibers. Only the increases in plant fiber 
exports, however, seem to be meaningful given that 
the base case exports of rice are very small.
Based on these results, it seems that different 
stakeholders will be affected differently by multi­
lateral market access reforms. The two African 
regions would lose part of their exports in the 
wake of the assumed reforms without further 
preferences, whereas world trade in virtually all 
agricultural and food products would increase. In
7 The results presented in this section are computed without including the Japanese tariff on rice in the deepening and widening scenario. This warrants specific comment. The Japanese rice tariff is set at a prohibitive level, in the multilateral market access scenario, the assumed halving of this tariff would result in a new tariff that is still prohibitive. Meanwhile, a complete deepening scenario would remove this tariff for the two African regions. As a result, exports and hence outputs of idee in the two regions would increase dramatically, leading to massive resource reallocation into rice production. Con­sidering the size of the Japanese rice market, however, it is not credible for Japan to maintain a prohibitive tariff on all countries but the ALDCs. As such, in the scenarios reported here, this possibility is excluded.
fact, market access reform would boost the total 
value of world exports by almost 6 percent, imply­
ing that the ALDCs' shares of agricultural exports 
would shrink relative to the increased world trade.
Scenario 2. Deepening and widening the trade 
preferences granted by developed countries would 
reverse the negative export effects on the two 
ALDCs caused by the multilateral market access 
reform. Results from scenario 2 [Table 1] show that 
compared with scenario 1, total exports of agricul­
tural and food products from SSA-1 would increase 
by more than 17 percent, whereas those from SSA- 
2 would increase by around 30 percent. In dollar 
terms, following the deepening and widening 
action, total agricultural and food exports from 
SSA-1 would be more than US$2.4 billion, 
representing an increase of more than US$360 
million from scenario 1. For SSA-2, the increase is 
almost US$2.5 billion. These increases more than 
make up for the losses sustained from the multi­
lateral market access reform.
The increase in total agricultural exports would not 
be evenly distributed across products. Those 
products important to the ALDCs that are 
excluded from the current preference programs 
would experience the greatest increase. In percent­
age terms, the increases are the highest for meat 
products, dairy products, and sugar for both 
regions. In addition, exports of fruits and vegeta­
bles, as well as oilseeds, would increase significantly 
for SSA-2. Most notable among the changes are 
the increased exports of sugar, reaching more than 
US$400 million for SSA-1 and around US$2.5 
billion for SSA-2, owing to the high market access 
barriers for non-LDC exporters [hence, large 
preference margins] and the substantial trade bar­
riers maintained by several advanced countries for 
sugar exports from the ALDCs. In contrast, 
exports of several products from the two ALDCs 
would decrease [such as plant fibers from both 
regions and other crops from SSA-2] because of 
the intersectoral resource movement triggered by 
the expansion of preferential coverage and the 
deepening of existing preference programs.
Scenario 3. Those developing countries chosen for 
the broadening scenario [scenario 3] generally do 
not offer extended preferential treatment targeting 
the ALDCs. Their imports from the two African 
regions are very small, and in some cases no such 
imports exist according to the GTAP database. So
the resulting changes in exports from the ALDCs 
in scenario 3 not only depend on the MFN market 
access barriers of the chosen developing countries, 
but are also related to the initial export volumes 
from the ALDCs.
The overall increase in agricultural exports due to 
the broadening of trade preferences would be 
around US$130 million for SSA-1 and US$260 
million for SSA-2. The main sources of these 
increases are fruits and vegetables, plant fibers, 
other crops, and meat products. In contrast, 
exports of sugar, rice, and oilseeds from both 
regions actually decrease slightly. It should be 
noted that the overall increases in exports reported 
for scenario 3 are much smaller than what are 
obtained from the deepening and widening scenario 
[scenario 2], Although this result may have some­
thing to do with the Armington trade structure 
employed in the model and with the fact that there 
is little agricultural trade between the ALDCs and 
the developing countries used in the scenario, the 
market size of the developed countries and their 
role as the ALDCs' traditional markets may be 
more responsible for the relatively larger export 
effects from the deepening and widening scenario.8 
This result seems to discount the optimism about 
South-South trade, at least in the short and 
medium run.
Welfare effects. Although the multilateral market 
access reforms [scenario 1] would benefit most non- 
LDC countries, the welfare effects turn out to be 
negative for the two African regions [losses of 
about US$50 million and US$184 million for SSA-1 
and SSA-2, respectively], a result that is consistent 
with Yu and Jensen [2005], To understand this 
result, the focus should be on the negative export 
price effect, which dominates the total terms-of-
8A simple sensitivity analysis with respect to the 
Armington elasticities has been carried out by rerunning 
the three experiments with a new set of elasticities that 
are twice as large as the original ones used in the GTAP 
model. Results from these simulations show that the 
increases in agricultural exports from the African LDCs 
will be higher under both the deepening and broadening 
scenarios compared with those reported in Table 1. 
Nevertheless, higher Armington elasticities boost exports 
under the deepening scenario much more than under the 
broadening scenario, suggesting that the qualitative con­
clusion reported in the main text is quite stable with 
respect to the degree of substitution in the Armington 
structure.
trade effect for both regions. This negative export 
price effect is due to two reasons. On the one 
hand, multilateral market access reforms would lead 
to lower prices in the export markets and hence 
lower prices for those ALDC exports covered in 
preference programs. At the same time, lowering 
MFN market access barriers would lead to higher 
prices for exports from countries not receiving 
preferential treatment. Hence, non-LDCs would be 
able to crowd out exports originating from the 
ALDCs. On the other hand, preferential access 
granted to the ALDCs would actually "trap" their 
exports and prevent them from shifting to other 
markets, thereby further dampening the prices of 
ALDCs' exports. In addition, the ALDCs may be 
hurt by higher world market prices for their 
imports.
The negative welfare effects on the two African 
regions would be more than offset by the deepen­
ing of the developed countries' existing preference 
programs. Results from scenario 2 show that such a 
move by the developed countries would not only 
result in improved terms of trade for the ALDCs, 
but also lead to efficiency gains for them. For SSA- 
1, the total welfare improvement from scenario I 
would be more than US$110 million, whereas for 
SSA-2 it would be almost US$800 million. Most of 
these gains are due to improved terms of trade, 
with the positive export price effects being the 
dominant factor.
Whereas deepening preferences by the developed 
countries seems to generate substantial benefits for 
the ALDCs, according to the simulation results, 
broadening preferences would not generate similar 
export expansion and welfare gains for them. The 
additional welfare gain to SSA-1 from the broaden­
ing scenario would be a little more than US$50 
million, and that to SSA-2 would be around US$90 
million.
Effects on preference-granting and other countries. 
Deepening trade preferences by developed pref­
erence-granting countries would lead to small 
terms-of-trade losses to these countries. For 
instance, the EU-25 would suffer a welfare loss of 
US$582 million [see Table 2], This loss, however, is 
much smaller than the gains obtained from the 
multilateral market access reforms (scenario 1], On 
balance, the developed countries would gain signifi­
cantly from multilateral market access reforms, 
even taking into consideration their losses from
deepening their preference programs to the 
ALDCs. For non-LDC developing countries, the 
negative impact of more favorable preferential 
treatment for the ALDCs would also be small, 
implying that the expansion of exports from the 
ALDCs would generally not be a big concern for 
them. For example, the economic welfare of China 
and India would be reduced by only about US$4 
and US$17 million, respectively. Thus, broadening 
trade preferences to the ALDCs would lead to very 
minor welfare losses for the advanced developing 
countries.
Overall, other countries' costs of broadening and 
deepening preferences for African LDCs appear 
minor. Although not presented here, the trade 
diversion effects are also small, a result that is con­
sistent with the ALDCs' very small exports in total 
world trade. Therefore, the concern about trade 
diversion does not appear to be a major issue.
Alternative Policy Measures
In addition to or instead of the deepening, widen­
ing, broadening, and strengthening of trade 
preferences for the ALDCs, the ALDCs may con­
sider domestic policy changes and institutional 
reforms aimed at creating an enabling environment 
for their export-oriented industries and at eliciting 
adequate supply responses.
Responding to concerns about preference erosion, 
a number of authors have suggested that enhancing 
preferences is not the right answer to the problem. 
They insist that the multilateralism championed by 
the WTO will eventually help the poorest countries 
and that transitory issues such as preference 
erosion can be handled by complementary non­
trade policy measures, including effective develop­
ment aid that aims at tackling prevalent supply 
response constraints in the ALDCs and at creating 
supportive and enabling domestic infrastructure.
Assignment
Your assignment is to propose a policy package 
that would tackle the preference erosion problem 
facing ALDCs, for discussion by the WTO. The 
package may include policies to strengthen 
preferences and/or complementary measures.
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Table 1: Changes in  E xports o f Selected A g ricu ltu re  and Food Products from  SSA-1 and SSA-2
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3
E xp o rt vo lum e
(m illio n  U S $ ) %  change
E x p o rt vo lum e
(m illio n  U S $ ) %  change
E x p o rt vo lum e
(m illio n  U S $ ) %  change
P ro d uc t SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA -2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA -2
Grains 35.8 48.4 -2.6 -9.5 36.3 48.6 1.3 0.4 36.3 49.1 0.1 0.9
Fruits and 
vegetables 130.0 810.1 -10.9 -8.3 130.2 1,109.0 0.2 36.9 212.3 1,192.5 63.0 7.5
Oilseeds 25.2 236.1 0.7 -21.5 25.5 403.7 1.2 71.0 25.2 398.8 -1.3 -1.2
Plant fibers 112.9 896.5 0.3 0.5 108.3 841.8 -4.1 -6.1 113.3 910.7 4.6 8.2
Other crops 1,040.6 3,322.0 -5.9 -4.4 1,078.7 3,047.9 3.7 -8.3 1,137.6 3,104.8 5.5 1.9
Bovine meats 1.6 25.8 -26.0 -14.4 1.9 24.4 17.6 -5.5 2.1 25.0 12.6 2.7
Other meats 7.5 36.4 -11.4 -9.4 9.7 53.8 28.9 47.6 14.6 61.6 50.5 14.5
Vegetable oils 6.8 142.7 -8.4 -7.8 6.5 130.0 -4.5 -8.9 6.8 129.4 5.5 -0.5
Dairy 1.1 29.3 -8.0 -5.8 3.3 47.9 191.6 63.5 3.3 49.1 1.1 2.6
Rice 5.7 30.9 2.3 1.8 5.5 28.8 -3.7 -6.6 5.3 28.5 -3.8 -1.1
Sugar 93.6 169.9 -21.3 -49.8 411.6 2,507.8 339.9 1376.1 402.6 2,499.4 -2.2 -0.3
Other food 508.3 2,058.1 -5.6 -5.6 513.7 2,034.3 1.1 -1.2 511.4 2,079.8 -0.4 2.2
T o ta l a g rifo o d 2,052.1 8,226.2 -6.5 -6.9 2,415.3 10,697.5 17.7 30.0 2,555.7 10,960.3 5.8 2.5
T o ta l 6,569.2 52,985.5 -0.7 -0.5 6,674.8 53,948.0 1.6 1.8 6,718.2 54,071.2 0.7 0.2
Source: Simulation results.
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Table 2 : W elfare Results fo r Selected C ountries and Regions (m illio n  US$)
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3
C o u n tr y /re g io n Effic iency
Term s o f  
tra d e T o ta l E ffic iency
T erm s o f  
trade T o ta l E ffic iency
Term s o f  
tra d e T o ta l
Australia and 
New Zealand 4.2 566.2 545.3 1.2 5.8 6.1 -0.2 -6.5 -6.8
China 830.8 -164.6 575.2 3.9 -1.6 -4.4 3.0 -6.1 -2.6
Japan 3,263.5 -536.2 2,766.7 -4.3 -37.3 -49.3 2.0 -0.7 0.5
Rest of East 
Asia 1,141.5 -32.5 1,067.6 -81.5 -27.0 -109.8 2.1 -0.9 1.1
ASEAN 554.7 289.6 760.9 -2.6 9.8 7.1 -7.5 -24.1 -31.2
India 830.8 -216.0 610.9 -6.9 -8.1 -16.6 22.5 -26.9 -4.6
Canada 674.5 -112.9 551.3 1.4 9.7 11.0 0.3 -2.4 -1.8
USA 87.5 957.0 1,292.6 14.5 -68.3 -99.4 2.1 -10.7 -18.4
Mexico 321.2 -208.1 108.9 -0.1 6.3 5.8 4.2 -3.5 1.0
Argentina 46.3 259.4 270.1 -0.1 -2.4 -2.2 0.0 -1.8 -1.6
Brazil 162.2 888.0 1,098.6 -3.0 -5.4 -10.3 1.2 -5.0 -4.3
EU-25 5,586.4 -1,255.9 4,276.2 -72.6 -494.1 -582.3 15.5 -33.0 -19.9
SSA-1 -1.4 -42.5 -50.0 3.9 91.4 111.8 -1.1 48.2 53.5
SSA-2 -38.9 -126.8 -184.2 168.2 527.9 772.4 17.0 66.4 91.2
World 16,400.2 -12.2 16,387.8 3.6 -4.6 -1.6 62.5 -0.2 62.3
Source: Simulation results
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